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BOOK REVIEW 
A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory 
by Russell Hittinger 
(Notre Dame. IN.: University of Notre Dame Press. 1987. $24.95.) 
In this book, Hittinger seeks to provide a critique of the "new natural law theory" 
developed over the past two decades by Germain G. Grisez and, to a lesser degree , by John 
M. Finnis . Grisez's articulation of the position began in the early 1960s with the 
publication of his Contraception and the Natural Law, continued with the publication of 
major articles and massive books concerned with abortion, euthanasia and other issues , 
and , while still developing today, culminated in the 1983 publication of his Christian 
Moral PrinCiples. the first of a projected four-volume work in moral theology. In Christian 
Moral Principles. Grisez not only summarized his theory of natural law, but also showed 
how the natural law is brought to completion by the redeeming act of Jesus Christ. Finnis 
has presented the position in two major works, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980) and 
Fundamentals of Ethics (1983) and in several major articles. 
Hittinger's assessment of the work of Grisez and Finnis on natural law theory is, to put it 
mildly, exceedingly negative. Hittinger claims that their work is fatally flawed in its 
foundations because these authors have failed , in his judgment, to root their natural law 
theory in philosophical anthropology and metaphysics. As a result , their natural law 
theory is sad ly lacking and fails utterly to show why and how nature is normative. In fact , 
he regards their effort as more Kantian than Thomistic because of the autonomy from 
metaphysics and philosophical anthropology that they accord moral theory. He believes 
that their position is , in essence, a quest for individualistic self-fulfillment which fails to 
recognize the intrinsic value of human persons and the demands of the common good. He 
likewise claims that their theory offers a woefully inadequate account of religion and that, 
in Grisez's hands at any rate, it ultimately collapses into an irrational form of fideism. 
These are serious charges. If what Hittinger has to say is true, his work constitutes a 
devasting dismantling of the Grisez-Finnis "project," one that its authors would be well 
advised to abandon immediately and start afresh . But note the "if": Hi/what Hittinger has 
to say is true." But that is the central question: are Hittinger's criticisms true? Are they on 
target? My judgment is that they are not. Rather, they are directed against a grotesque 
caricature of the natural law position carefully developed by Grisez and Finnis, not against 
the genuine article. 
Fully to substantiate my judgment that Hittinger's critique is based on a terrible 
misrepresentation and misunderstanding of what Grisez and Finnis are doing would 
require a lengthy essay, not a relatively brief book review. But I have the obligation to offer 
some support for my judgment. I shall do so by illustrating some of the very serious 
shortcomings in Hittinger's analysis, noting first of all the very inaccurate way in which 
Hittinger speaks of the "basic goods" identified by Grisez and Finnis and central to their 
theory. Next I shall comment on his claim that their account of the first principles of the 
natural law, far from being rooted in the tradition of St. Thomas, is Kantian and fails to 
show the basic human goods and our knowledge of primary natural law precepts must be 
grounded in metaphysical and anthropological theory. Finally, I shall consider his claim 
that their position is basically an individualistic quest for self-fulfillment that ignores the 
intrinsic and irreplaceable va lue of human persons and neglects to take into account the 
requirements of the common good. 
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Hittinger correctly observes that Grisez has employed more than one term to refer to 
basic human goods, calling them "possibilities," "purposes," "values." and "ideals" as well 
as "goods" (cf. H , p. 40). But Hittinger (ibid.) also asserts that Grisez calls these basic goods 
"inclinat ions" and "tendencies," and elsewhere (H, p. 55) he writes as follows: ". . all the 
goods are defined as actions which are attractive to the agent" (emphasis added). But Grisez 
never refers to the basic goods of human persons as " inclinations" or "tendencies." Rather, 
with St. Thomas (cf. Summa Theologiae, 1-2, q. 94, a. 2) he refers to the basic or natural in-
clinations or tendencies within human persons, orienting them to the goods perfective of them. 
T he goods, as Grisez sees it (again along with St. Thomas) are "ends", not inclinat ions. Nor 
does Grisez ever define the goods as "actions attractive to the agent". The subjectivism that 
Hittinger attributes to Grisez by speak ing in this way is utterly without foundation in 
anyt hing that Grisez has written a nd is totall y at variance with his ent ire wo rk. 
A central charge levelled by Hittinger agai nst Grisez and F innis is that their account of 
the natural law is more Kantian than Thomistic insofar as it posits a non-rational intuition 
of the primary precepts of the nat ura l law and does not show how nature is "normati ve." 
that is . how natural law precepts a re grounded in philosophical anthropology and 
metaphys ics. This charge is simply fa lse. In their treatment of the first precepts of the 
natural law. G risez and Finnis ex plicitly base their work on the thought ofSt. Thomas. The 
Common Doctor insisted that the/irst principles of practical reason or of the natural law. 
like the first principles of speculative inquiry, are completely underivedfrom anyt hing prior 
to them; otherwise they would not be " first" or "primary." Aquinas's point - and the point 
which Grisez and Finnis make too - is that there are propositions of practical reason , 
rooted in the concept of the "good," which are self-evident ly true or per se nota. Among 
these a re the propositions that "good is to be done and pursued and its opposite (evi l) is to 
be avoided ," and , as Aquinas himself wr ites, (Summa Theologiae, 1-2, q. 94, a. 2), "all those 
things that reason na turally apprehends as good," i.e ., a ll those goods to which we are 
naturally inclined, are goods to be pursued and done and their oppos ites are evi ls to be 
avoided. 
Nor does this mean that Grisez and Finnis are insoucian t or unaware of the relationship 
between a sound metaphysics a nd anthropology and a sound moral theory. These go 
together; but we do not derive our knowledge of the natural law by deducing it from our 
knowledge of human nature; persons who may well have a very erroneous understanding of 
human na ture (e.g. , a behavioris t) might well know what they are req uired to do by the 
moral law. Moreover, both Grisez and Finnis insist that were our nature other than it is, 
then the goods perfective of us and orienting us dynamically toward them would be 
different than they act ually a re. Moreover, both aut hors, and part icularly Gr isez, have 
written at length to criticize the fa lse dua lism of modern philosophy and theology which 
denigrates the good of human bodily life. Grisez, moreover, has written at length in 
criticism of modern determinist philosophies and has amply defended such anthropological 
truths as the freedom of self-determination. 
In Hittinger's account, (cf. H, pp. 53 ff) , the Grisez-Finnis theory emphasizes o ne's own 
self-fulfillment and the avoidance of unnecessary se lf limitation. He says (p. 87) that their 
theory "seems to limit the motivationa l life of practica l reason merely to a concern. or 
respect, for modes of one's own well-being and fulfillment." This claim is a serious injustice 
to Grisez and Finnis and simply ignores what they actua lly say. Within sentences of one 
passage that Hittinger cites ou t of the context to support his claim, Grisez, for instance, had 
this to say: "The idea l of integral human fulfillment is that of a single system in which all the 
goods of human persons would contribute to the fulfillment of the who le community of 
persons." A nd shortl y la ter. in the same sect ion of hi s wri tings from which Hittinger cites a 
passage to prove Grisez's individ ualism, Grisez writes: " Integra l human fulfillment is not 
individualistic sati sfaction of desires; it is the realization of a ll the human goods in the 
whole hu man community" (cf. Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, p. 186). 
I could continue to note simi lar misrepresentations of the Grisez-Finnis theory found in 
Hittinger's book. But I think that I have a lready shown sufficiently how wide o ff the mark 
a re Hittinger's claims. The theory he attacks is simply one of his own making. I have been 
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studying Grisez and Finnis for years (along with a st ud y of St. Thomas) . I picked up 
Hittinger's book. hoping to find in it so me constructive criti cism. or at least a pointing out 
of a reas that a re not clear a nd need development in the work of Grisez a nd Finnis. But as I 
read the book. I cou ld not believe my eyes . because the "Grisez-Finnis theory" I found in it 
was utt erly unrecognizable to one who had spent man y years studying it. I knew somethi ng 
was wrong. A close inspection of the work and comparison of some key passages with 
passages in Grisez a nd Finnis showed how poorly Hittinger had done hi s work. It is sad to 
re nder such a ve rdict. but it is the on ly one I can honestly give . 
- William E. May 
Professor of Moral Theology 
The Catholic University of America 
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